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I. Introduction

The common law doctrine of “employment at will” has
dominated U.S. employment law for over a century.2 Pursuant to
this concept, an employer may discharge an employee at any time
for any reason, or for no reason at all.3 An employee may similarly
resign at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all.4 Despite
the rule’s facial even-handedness,5 it operates against the
background of “the deeply rooted conception of the employment
relation as a dominant-servient relation rather than one of mutual
rights and obligations.”6 Within that relationship, “the employer
[has] the right to impose any requirement on the employee, give
2. See, e.g., KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM 85 (1991) (“The principle of
hiring ‘at will,’ under which either party could terminate the contract for any
reason, began to take hold in the 1880s.”); see also, e.g., Richard A. Bales,
Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment As an Interjurisdictional Race to
the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 457 (2008)
(“[S]cholars seem to agree that most American states did not formally begin to
adopt the at-will rule until Horace Gay Wood, a New York State treatise writer,
published Master and Servant in 1877.”); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will
in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65,
67 (2000) (citing Wood’s treatise as origin of the rule); Andrew P. Morriss,
Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 704–10 (1994) (identifying “Maine
(1851) and Mississippi (1858)” as “the earliest common law adopters” and noting
the appearance of a “weak version” in 1860s civil codes); Sanford M. Jacoby, The
Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England:
A Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85 (1982) (discussing judicial adoption of
at-will rule in late 19th century); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976) (citing adoption
of rule from Wood’s treatise by New York Court of Appeals in 1895). But see
Deborah
A.
Ballam,
Exploding
the
Original
Myth
Regarding
Employment-At-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 91, 98 (1996) (arguing at-will “doctrine has been firmly embedded in our
employment practices since colonial days”).
3. See Summers, supra note 2, at 65 (“Men must be left without
interference . . . to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no
cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per
se.” (citing Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884))); see also Richard
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 947–48
(1984) (same).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 953–77 (arguing that the at-will rule
protects individual liberty and promotes mutual gains in utility for employees and
employers alike).
6. Summers, supra note 2, at 78.
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any order and insist on obedience, [and] change any term of
employment,” backed by the ultimate right to “discard the
employee at any time.”7
Not content with the domination they already enjoy under
this arrangement, employers have sought to enhance their control
by placing restrictions and conditions on the very element that
makes at-will employment mutually beneficial and protects
workers from employer coercion: The right to quit.8 One
longstanding approach has been to limit employees’ choice of
alternative employment through noncompete covenants.
Historically limited to high-level executives or employees with
access to proprietary information, employers have increasingly
imposed noncompetes on rank-and-file, low-wage workers.9 At
least in theory, the legal limits on their enforcement temper the
effectiveness of noncompetes as barriers to exit.10 In most
7. Id.; see Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government (Mar. 4–5, 2015), in
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, Mar. 2015, at 94, 105:
For the most part . . . at-will employment . . . grants the employer
sweeping legal authority not only over workers’ lives at work but also
over their off-duty conduct. Under the employment-at-will baseline,
workers, in effect, cede all of their rights to their employers, except
those specifically guaranteed to them by law, for the duration of the
employment relationship.
(emphasis added); see also Feinman, supra note 2, at 132–33 (“Employment of
will is the ultimate guarantor of the capitalist’s authority over the worker.”).
8. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 957, 966–67, 973–76 (arguing that the
freedom to quit at-will gives employees countervailing control over, and protection
against, abuse by employers); see also Alchain & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777
(1972) (arguing that employment relations are not based on hierarchical power
and control by employers over employees, but on “terms that must be acceptable
to both parties . . . [because] neither the employer nor the employee is bound by
any contractual obligations to continue their relationship”).
9. Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income
Workers from Monopsony and Collusion, HAMILTON PROJECT, 6–7 (Feb. 2018),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_inncome_workers_fro
m_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice) (noting recent example of fast food
workers bound by noncompetes and citing research indicating “12 percent of
low-income workers” and “one in five workers” overall subject to noncompetes in
their current jobs, with nearly one in four subject to a noncompete from either
their current or past employment).
10. See Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and
the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 782–83 (2002)
(highlighting use of noncompetes in California, despite state law prohibiting their
enforcement); see also COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY:
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jurisdictions, noncompetes are subject to judicial scrutiny under
“the ‘rule of reasonableness,’ requiring employers to establish both
a legitimate property interest deserving protection and that the
restraint is reasonable in scope in consideration of the harm to the
employee and effect on the public.”11 In a few states, employee
noncompetes are generally unenforceable.12
More recently, employers have adopted a different tactic:
Demanding payment from departing employees in the form of
reimbursements for commission and bonus payments, training
expenditures, and relocation allowances.13 These post-employment
financial obligations force departing employees to forfeit
compensation they have received or to bear expenses that have
traditionally been understood as part of the employer’s cost of
doing business.14
An example of such provisions recently drew media attention
in connection with a controversy over politically charged
statements that Sinclair Broadcast Group required news anchors
at its television stations to read on air.15 The employees’ contracts
obligated those who voluntarily quit outside of a limited time
TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES 8 (2016) (observing that
noncompetes “are prevalent even in States where they are not enforced” and that
“in California, which does not generally enforce non-compete agreements, 22
percent of workers report that they have signed one”).
11. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 965 n.5 (2006).
12. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (2018) (voiding contracts that restrict
individuals from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business); Mont. Code
Ann. § 28-2-703 (West 2018) (same); N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-06 (West 2018)
(providing limited exceptions to the general prohibition of contracts that restrict
individuals from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business); Okla. Stat.
Ann. § 217 (West 2018) (same).
13. See, e.g., Jordyn Holman & Rebecca Greenfield, Sinclair Employees Say
Contracts Make It Too Expensive to Quit, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/sinclair-employees-saytheir-contracts-make-it-too-expensive-to-quit (reporting on the constricting
effects of the Sinclair Broadcast, Inc. employment contracts on employees) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
14. See id. (same).
15. See Stephen Battaglio & Matt Pearce, Backlash Grows over Sinclair
Broadcast Group’s ‘Must-Run’ Conservative Content on Local TV Stations, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-sinclairpromo-20180405-story.html (describing the tension at Sinclair TV stations over
the forced presentation of “prepackaged reports” reflecting conservative views)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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window, or were fired for cause, to “immediately pay to Employer
as liquidated damages (and not as a penalty) an amount equal to
forty percent (40%) of Employee’s then annual compensation” for a
period equal to “the greater of (a) twenty-five percent (25%), or
(b) the percentage of the current contract year remaining after
such termination.”16 The clause recites that the payment is “[i]n
consideration of Employer’s expenditure of considerable money,
time and effort in training, promoting and assimilating the
Employee into Employer’s business and operations.”17 Sinclair
employees cited the contract provisions as a reason they
acquiesced despite misgivings about the statements:
All those people who are like, “I would quit,” that’s really easy
for you to say. CNN put something out calling all the news
anchors complicit or zombies or whatever yesterday, and I just
think that portion of this is unfair. These jobs—they’re very
hard to come by. And if I quit, I owe the company 40 percent of
my salary, plus a percentage of the [redacted] years remaining
on my contract, plus any bonuses that they’ve paid to me and
any reimbursements that they’ve paid to me. And they’re going
to take me to court for it. And in the time that I’m in court, I’m
not employable.18

Some scholars have endorsed repayment obligations as a
less-restrictive alternative to noncompetes.19 But, the effect of such
16. See Holman & Greenfield, supra note 13 (displaying excerpts from a
Sinclair employment contract).
17. Id.; see Matt Pearce (@mattpearce), Twitter (Apr. 2, 2018, 9:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/mattdpearce/status/980850915623108609
(providing
an
excerpt of a Sinclair Broadcast employee contract) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
18. Maxwell Strachan, How to Hit Sinclair Where It Hurts, According to an
Anonymous
Sinclair
Anchor,
HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sinclair-as-told-to-anchor_us_5ac3f42ae
4b0ac473edb0108 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal for Civil Rights &
Social Justice); see We’re Journalists at a Sinclair News Station. We’re Pissed, VOX
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2018/4/5/17202336/sinclairbroadcasting-promo-deadspin (“We know some anchors tried to resist, but for
many reasons, they felt pressured to read it. They had families to support. They
literally couldn’t afford to quit.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Holman & Greenfield, supra note 13
(“[C]urrent and former Sinclair employees said it was the potential financial
penalty that had the greatest impact on those thinking of quitting.”).
19. See Brandon S. Long, Protecting Employer Investment in Training:
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1297 (2005)
(identifying repayment agreements as a more sensible alternative to noncompete
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provisions on employees’ ability to exercise their right to quit may
be even more onerous.20 Whereas a noncompete only precludes a
departing employee from pursuing certain opportunities for a
limited period of time, a repayment obligation may amount to what
is often a substantial exit toll that operates regardless of the
employee’s reason for leaving.
Restraining employees’ freedom of exit, whether through
noncompetes or repayment obligations, raises both efficiency and
equity concerns stemming from reduced job mobility and an
attendant loss of employee bargaining power in the labor market.21
To remedy these problems, repayment obligations, like
noncompetes, should be subject to heightened scrutiny. At a
minimum, employers asserting claims for reimbursement should
be required to establish the amounts sought through evidence of
actual expenditures or costs, rather than allowing employers to
rely on boilerplate “liquidated damages” recitations. As with
noncompetes under the “rule of reasonableness,” employers should
also be required to show that a repayment obligation protects a
legitimate and genuine business interest, and that the terms are
reasonably tailored to protect that interest without turning
employees into indentured servants or restraining labor market
competition.

agreements); see also Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over
the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV.
721, 755 (2002) (describing training repayment agreements as an alternative to
covenants not to compete).
20. See Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Corporate America Is Suppressing
Wages
for
Many
Workers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
02/28/opinion/corporate-america-suppressingwages.html (identifying monopsony power as the cause of employment wages
stagnancy) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal for Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
21. See id. (“When employers exercise monopsonistic power, wages are
suppressed, jobs are left unfilled, and economic growth suffers.”); see also COUNCIL
OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 10, at 2–3 (discussing the deleterious effect of labor
market monopsony on economic efficiency and inequality).
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II. Types of Post-Employment Obligations
A. Relocation Incentives
Employers have long provided incentives for out-of-town
recruits in the form of relocation bonuses or other payments to
cover the cost of moving to the employer’s home base. Such
incentives often require repayment if the employee voluntarily
leaves within a certain period of time. These arrangements,
seemingly reasonable on their face, and usually involving
relatively modest sums, have proven to be a gateway to more
onerous post-employment obligations.
The case law on recoupment of relocation incentives is sparse,
likely because the overwhelming majority of employees have no
employment contract, most employment contracts contain no
relocation bonus, most employees stay for the requisite period of
time, or employers do not pursue reimbursement claims that may
be worth only a few thousand dollars. Indeed, in most of the
reported cases involving moving bonuses, the employer raises the
issue as a counterclaim or defense to claims brought by the
employee.
For example, in Fondel v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,22 the
plaintiff sued his former employer for race discrimination.23 The
employer then asserted a counterclaim based on a “Relocation
Reimbursement Agreement” that plaintiff signed at hire:
I agree that if, before the expiration of twelve months from the
date of hire I . . . vacate the position without authority, or if I
am removed for cause, I will, upon demand repay to the said
Grumman Aerospace Corporation a sum of money equal to that
paid to or for me for transportation and relocation expenses for
myself and my dependents.24

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s discrimination claim and
found for the employer on the relocation reimbursement
counterclaim.25 Affirming that judgment, the appellate court found
22. 884 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1989).
23. See id. at 659 (addressing allegations of racial discrimination and
concluding that they were without merit).
24. Id. at 658.
25. See id. (citing Silberman v. Penn General Agencies of New York, Inc., 63
A.D.2d 929, 406 (1978)) (“Al]though the plaintiff was found not to have committed
such acts of misconduct as disqualified him from benefits, he still could be found
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that plaintiff was dismissed for cause and that the employer was
entitled to reimbursement of $7,861.66 for relocation expenses.26
Similarly, in Ebenstein v. Ericsson Internet Applications,
Inc.,27 a former employee brought an action for severance benefits,
and the employer asserted a counterclaim for relocation
expenses.28 The court dismissed the employee’s claim and found for
the former employer on the counterclaim, concluding that the
employee’s relocation expenses were paid “on the express condition
that he remain with the company for a period of one year.”29 The
court awarded documented expenses which the employer
estimated as $74,346.59.30
In these cases, the employees raised no fundamental
objections to the relocation expense provisions.31 Rather, the main
dispute is over the contractual conditions regarding when
termination of employment triggers the obligation.32 Similarly, in
Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Shipp,33 the agreement provided that the
employee must reimburse the employer for 100 percent of
relocation expenses if he “voluntarily left employment” within the
first year, and 50 percent if he did so within the second year.34 The
employee argued that the termination of his employment was

to have been sufficiently deficient in his job performance to justify a ‘for cause’
termination.”).
26. See id. at 658–59 (same).
27. 263 F. Supp. 2d 636 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
28. See id. (addressing an employee claim against a leading provider of
mobile communications systems).
29. Id. at 643.
30. See id. at 643–44 (explaining that the discrepancies in the expense
estimates required further appropriate documentation detailing the exact
amounts).
31. See Fondel, 884 F.2d at 658 (finding no opposition to the terms of the
employee relocation policies); see also Ebenstein, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (same).
32. See Fondel, 884 F.2d at 659 (focusing on the terms of the employee
repayment agreement); see also Ebenstein, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (same).
33. No. 8:01CV647, 2003 WL 431613, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 24, 2003)
(addressing allegations of an involuntary termination and an employee’s options
under a management incentive plan).
34. See id. (reporting the parameters of an employee’s voluntary exit from
the company).
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involuntary, and “offer[ed] no other defense to this case.”35 The
court concluded that the issue should go to the jury.36
Counterclaims seeking the return of relocation incentives may
not have been brought if the employees had not initially asserted
their own claims from the start. The amounts involved were usually
not huge, and it comports with most people’s sense of fair play that
the employer should not be stuck with the moving bill for a new
hire who quits shortly after getting the free trip.37
35. Id.
36. See id. at *3 (stating that the factual question existed as to whether the
employer had constructively discharged the employee). Other courts have also
faced similar questions. See Niehous v. Arkansas Glass Container Corp., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that a provision to pay back a $5,000
relocation incentive only applied if employee had quit, not if employer terminated
employment); see also Staples v. Sceppaguercio, No. 0102641, 2002 WL 31957012,
at *1, *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2002) (resolving a material factual dispute
as to whether claim for relocation expense recoupment was settled).
37. Nevertheless, courts have often invoked the at-will rule to deny claims
of employees who have relocated at their own expense and inconvenience to accept
employment and were then discharged shortly after starting the job. See, e.g.,
Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 493 S.E.2d 420, 423–24 (N.C. 1997)
(concluding that a plaintiff’s change of residence did not constitute additional
consideration that would make an otherwise at-will employment into a for-cause
employment); see also, e.g., Poff v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the employment was at-will and thus did not benefit
from an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v.
Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that forsaking prior
employment and moving to new employer’s city did not satisfy the statute of
frauds); Beyda v. USAir, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1394, 1396–97 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (finding
that the parties had specifically contracted for at-will employment and that an
implied contract of employment for a reasonable period of time did not exist). In
some cases, courts have recognized an exception to the at-will rule where an
employee gave up secure employment and relocated or incurred other special
hardship to accept a new job in response to the employer’s special recruitment
efforts or assurances of security, only to be fired a short time after starting. See,
e.g., Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 595 A.2d 70, 73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(stating that an employee giving up a secure position and uprooting her family
constituted sufficient additional consideration to rebut the employment at-will
presumption); see also, e.g., News Printing Co. v. Roundy, 597 A.2d 662, 665 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (concluding that an employee giving up secure employment,
selling his home, and purchasing a new home to change jobs constituted sufficient
additional consideration to overcome the presumption of at-will employment);
Romack v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Indiana, 511 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind. 1987)
(concluding that being recruited to leave, leaving permanent employment,
purchasing a new home, and moving family constituted sufficient consideration
to rebut the at-will employment presumption). Some courts have also allowed
promissory estoppel claims for damages incurred in relocating, or making
preparations to do so, in reliance of a job offer that was rescinded before the
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Relocation reimbursement obligations may thus be a
somewhat weak deterrent against quitting, but a stronger
deterrent against suing the former employer after the employee
has done so.38 These provisions, though, served as the camel’s nose
in the tent.
B. Training Costs
Another, more troubling, form of repayment obligation is
connected to employee training. When employers incur training
costs, they run the risk that employees might leave, taking the
knowledge and skills they have acquired with them.39
One way to reduce that risk is through a noncompete
provision.40 At least some courts have considered an employer’s
investments in employee training as a factor in determining the
validity of noncompetes.41 But, courts have commonly limited
protection to situations where “employers . . . spend substantial

employee started work. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d
114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (concluding that the appellant had a right to assume that
he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his employment duties).
But, courts have denied similar claims where the employee was discharged
shortly after starting the job, on the grounds that the promise of at-will
employment had been fulfilled. See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153
N.W.2d 587, 590 (Wis. 1967) (concluding that the employment was at-will and
could be terminated by either party once the promise of employment was
fulfilled).
38. See supra notes 23–37 and accompanying text.
39. See Long, supra 19, at 1301 (“Much like any other investment, employers
will invest in training only if they can recoup that investment by exploiting the
skills of those who receive the training.”).
40. See Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and
the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 707 (2011)
(describing noncompetes as a means of “asserting property rights over workers’
skills”); see also Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Non-Compete Covenants:
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 429 (2011)
(observing that enforceable non-compete provisions represent a form of employer
property rights over employees’ knowledge and relationships).
41. See, e.g., Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 SE 2d 566, 568–69 (Ga. 1982)
(“In determining the legitimacy of the interest the employer seeks to protect, the
court will take into account the employer’s time and monetary investment in the
employee’s skills and development of his craft.”).
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sums for special training”42 that “goes beyond what is usual,
regular, common, or customary in the industry in which the
employee is employed.”43 Such decisions essentially link the
provision of special training to the likelihood that the employee is
privy to the employer’s trade secrets or other proprietary
information.44
Even assuming employers have some legitimate interest in
protection against employees who would take the training and run,
noncompetes are too blunt an instrument for that purpose.45 They
do not distinguish between “training received at a firm [and]
expertise developed during [the employee’s] education or prior
spans of employment.”46 Further, they may not be triggered until
long after the employer has already recovered its expenses through
increased employee productivity.47 At least according to some
commentators, training expense reimbursement agreements
represent a better alternative:
In contrast to traditional noncompetes, repayment agreements
offer a sensible alternative whereby an employer’s level of
protection moves in lockstep with the cost of, and value derived
from, the training. That is, repayment agreements more closely

42. See Educ. for Living Seminars, Inc. v. Leone, 558 So. 2d 250, 253–54 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 597 (La.
1974)). (finding that $7,900 was a substantial expense for an Ontological Design
Course).
43. Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991); see Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (finding that a “three-week training school,” “on-the-job-training,” and
“company seminars and meetings” did not amount to “extraordinary training”
protectable under a noncompete); see also Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 SE
2d 670, 673 (Ga. App. 1998) (denying enforcement of noncompete where employer
provided “minimal training” in the form of two off-site programs); Robbins v.
Finlay, 645 P. 2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (identifying “extraordinary investment in
the training or education of the employee” as factor bearing on reasonableness of
a noncompete).
44. See Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.E.2d 499, 501–02
(W.Va. 1989) (denying enforcement of a noncompete where the evidence failed to
show that Moore provided the defendant with any unique or specialized training).
45. See Long, supra 19, at 1304 (describing policy rationales against
noncompetes).
46. Marx, supra note 40, at 707.
47. See Moore Business Forms, 382 S.E.2d at 502 (noting that the employer
“had more than recouped the value of its investment in the defendant’s training
in the almost fourteen years of his employment”).
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approximate the degree of protection required to encourage
employer investment in training.48

As with relocation costs, courts generally have upheld these
provisions.49 But, the reasoning and outcomes in training expense
reimbursement cases have varied.50
One leading case in this area is City of Oakland v. Hassey.51
Hassey signed a conditional offer with the Oakland Police
Department, stating that his selection as a police officer trainee
was on the condition that he repay the cost of his training (totaling
$8,000) if he voluntarily terminated his employment before the end
of five years.52 The amount owed was prorated over the five year
period: Hassey would owe 100% if he left after less than a year,
80% if he left before the end of the second year, 60% at the end of
his third year, 40% at the end of his fourth year, and 20% up to the
end of his fifth year.53
Hassey left after eleven months.54 The City withheld his final
paycheck and retirement balance, and brought an action against
him for the balance of the training reimbursement ($6,619.92), a
$100 collection fee, interest, attorney fees, and costs.55 The
appellate court held that “Oakland was permitted to seek
reimbursement from police officers who gained the benefit of its
training program at the Oakland Police Academy but did not stay
with the police department long enough for Oakland to benefit
from that training.”56
48. Long, supra note 19, at 1297.
49. See, e.g., Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 780–81 (7th Cir.
2002) (likening repayment agreements to other valid employment incentives).
50. Compare USS-Posco Indus. v. Case, 244 Cal. App. 4th 197, 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016) (employing principles of contract law and finding that the noncompete
did not lack consideration and was not unconscionable), with Heder, 295 F.3d at
777 (employing a law-and-economics approach).
51. 163 Cal. App. 4th 1477 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that former police
officer had failed to establish that the conditional offer, reimbursement
agreement, and repayment agreement were unlawful).
52. See id. at 1483 (describing the repayment terms set out in the
agreement).
53. See id. at 1484 (same).
54. See id. (noting the month that triggered the repayment obligation).
55. See id. (describing the City exercising its contractual rights under the
repayment agreement).
56. Id. at 1488; see Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
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The Hassey decision was not so much an affirmative
endorsement of recouping education costs, as it was an inability to
find any legal rationale to stop recoupment.57 Hassey’s defense
focused primarily on the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act58
(“FLSA”), which sets a minimum hourly wage and requires
time-and-a-half for overtime.59 In a creative argument, Hassey
contended that the reimbursement obligation violated the FLSA,
because it meant that the city did not pay Hassey his wages “free
and clear” and “unconditionally” as the statute requires.60
The court found no FLSA violation.61 Citing settled FLSA law,
the court noted that an employer may not pass along the costs of
“board, lodging, or other facilities” if “to do so would cut into an
employee’s minimum wage.”62 In this case, however, the court
concluded that “there is no evidence that deducting training costs
from Hassey’s paycheck as they were incurred would have reduced
his wages below minimum wage.”63
The court dismissively rejected Hassey’s state statutory
defenses, finding that California Labor Code sections 221, 222, and
223 deal with entirely distinct and inapplicable issues, none of
which implicated recoupment.64 In conclusion, the court held that

2010) (allowing Oakland to attain reimbursement of training costs).
57. See Hassey, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 1490 (“[T]here was nothing unlawful
about requiring Hassey to repay his training costs.”).
58. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2018) (codifying the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938).
59. See Hassey, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 1486 (stating that Hassey’s first
argument on appeal was that the reimbursement agreement violated the FLSA).
60. See id. at 1487 (“[Hassey] claims that while he was working under the
reimbursement agreement, he was being paid under the ‘condition’ that he repay
his training costs should he leave before the end of five years.” (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 531.35 (2007))).
61. See id. (finding the reasoning from Heder, 295 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2002),
persuasive).
62. See id. at 1489 (“[I]f an employer passes along such an expense to the
employee, the expense is deducted from the cash wage to determine compliance
with the FLSA minimum.”).
63. See id. at 1489–90 (stating that Hassey made $23.39 per hour during his
final pay period with Oakland, but that there was no evidence of how much
Hassey made during his training).
64. See id. at 1490–91 (“Three of the Labor Code provisions [Hassey] cites
address proper payment of wages, an issue not contemplated by the agreement to
repay Oakland for training expenses.”).
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“there was nothing unlawful about requiring Hassey to repay his
training costs if he left the police department before five years.”65
In USS-POSCO Industries v. Case, an “entry-level laborer and
side trim operator” signed up for a “learner program” training him
to become a “skilled maintenance technical electrical worker.”66 He
agreed that if he voluntarily terminated his employment within 30
months of completing the program, he would reimburse the
employer for a portion of the training.67 Two months after
completing the program, the employee quit.68 The employer filed
an action seeking $28,000, $1,000 for every month that remained
in the employee’s earnback period.69 Affirming a judgment for the
company, the appellate court found that the plaintiff
voluntarily agreed to participate in the training program and
understood UPI would front all the costs of the Learner
Program and expected reimbursement of training costs if he
chose to leave within 30 months of completing the program.
This was an agreement concerning advanced educational
costs . . . . Case quit UPI and went to work elsewhere, and he
was entirely free to do so. He had also agreed to reimburse UPI
for the costs it fronted for his advanced training, a benefit Case
retained despite his departure.70
In Heder v. City of Two Rivers,71 the collective bargaining agreement
between the city and the firefighters’ union provided that an employee
leaving within three years after receiving paramedic certification
training would reimburse the city for the cost of the training.72 Judge
Easterbrook offered a law-and-economics analysis to justify enforcement
of the repayment obligation:
Employees received considerable benefits as a result [of the
collective bargaining agreement]: [P]aramedic training that will
be useful for years to come, a 3% increase in
65. Id. at 1490 (footnote omitted).
66. USS-Posco Indus. v. Case, 244 Cal. App. 4th 197, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 203.
70. Id. at 208.
71. See Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding the reimbursement agreement valid and requiring Heder to repay the
full cost of training tuition and books).
72. See id. at 778 (describing the arrangement between the City and the
firefighter union).
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compensation . . . for those who are certified paramedics, and
extra compensation (at overtime rates) for the training time.
Residents of Two Rivers received the benefit of a fire
department more likely to save lives.73

As is often the case with law-and-economics analyses, the
outcome is somewhat preordained by neglecting certain costs and
benefits.74 What about the psychological cost to the firefighter who
hates Two Rivers but cannot afford what is effectively a
resignation fee? What about the resulting assault on morale, a
situation that the employer is less likely to address because it
knows the firefighters cannot leave? What about the idea that, if
the benefit provides an incentive for workers to sign up with Two
Rivers, doesn’t the repayment provide a disincentive? What about
the firefighter who has no choice but to leave Two Rivers for
whatever reason—such as a spouse’s job relocation—and must
take the hit?
The court’s narrow economic analysis, in Gradgrind fashion,
takes no account of such social and moral concerns.75 The
rationalizations defending these arrangements echo apologists for
Cold War emigration restrictions imposed by the Soviet bloc
countries, who claimed the measures were “intended to prevent
their professionals, trained at the expense of their society, from
being used to enrich other countries.”76 The apologists also stressed
the average citizen’s debt owed to the state, “which offered care
73. Id. at 781.
74. See id. at 782 (equating the training costs to a loan and neglecting to
require employers to factor in, among other things, the time value of money in the
form of interest).
75. See CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES 10 (Penguin Classics 1995):
Thomas Gradgrind, sir. A man of realities. A man of facts and
calculations. A man who proceeds upon the principle that two and two
are four, and nothing over, and who is not to be talked into allowing for
anything over. Thomas Gradgrind, sir—peremptorily Thomas—
Thomas Gradgrind. With a rule and a pair of scales, and the
multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and
measure any parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what it
comes to. It is a mere question of figures, a case of simple arithmetic.
See also Heder, 295 F.3d at 780 (“[The] repayment obligation shares with genuine
restrictive covenants the feature that it makes changing jobs costly. But that is
not enough to throw a contract out the window.”).
76. ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDER: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 88, 114–16 (Yale Univ. Press 1989).
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from birth, including subsidized education and training” and, thus,
they justified the emigration restrictions as an “‘education tax’
with the state having a right to recoup its investment.”77
California law offers some protection for employees in this
regard, providing that “[a]n employer shall indemnify his or her
employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the
employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her
duties.”78 As a state appellate court recently explained, “the broad
purpose of Labor Code section 2802 is to require an employer to
bear all of the costs inherent in conducting its business and to
indemnify employees from costs incurred in the discharge of their
duties for the employer’s benefit.”79
In that case, “[t]he City of Los Angeles . . . require[d] that all
newly hired police officers attend and graduate from the Los
Angeles Police Academy.”80 In response to the experience of having
“many officers who graduated from the academy . . . leaving within
a few years to join other law enforcement agencies,” the Los
Angeles City Council enacted a requirement that officers who
served less than 60 continuous months following graduation would
have to reimburse the city for the cost of police academy training.81
The court held that an “acknowledgment” signed by police recruits
agreeing to the repayment obligation was “entirely void.”82
In interpreting Labor Code § 2802, the court adopted the
analysis of the California Department of Industrial Relations,
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”)83 The DLSE
distinguished between situations where state or local law imposes
a licensure requirement for an occupation and those “where
licensure is not actually required by statute or ordinance but the
employer requires either the training or the licensing (or both)
simply as a requirement of employment.”84 In the former situation,
77. Id. at 114.
78. Cal. Labor Code § 2802(a) (West 2018).
79. In re Acknowledgment Cases, 239 Cal. App. 4th 1498, 1506 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015) (citing Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 952 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008)).
80. Id. at 1501.
81. Id. at 1501–02.
82. Id. at 1508.
83. See id. at 1506 (“We agree with DLSE’s analysis.”).
84. Id. (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t,
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the cost of obtaining a license—including any requisite training—
is the employee’s responsibility, and Labor Code § 2802 does not
apply.85 In the latter situation, by contrast, it is the employer who
has imposed the training or licensure requirement for its own
purposes, and thus under Labor Code § 2802 it is the employer who
must pay.86
The police academy training that the city required included
training for certification under state “peace officer standards and
training (POST) legislation,”87 and additional training related to
“challenges that are present within the City of Los Angeles [such
as] crime occurrences, crime patterns, [and] crime trends that are
specific to the city.”88 California law requires POST certification for
all police officers in the state.89 Consequently, “basic POST
certification training is not employer-mandated training as
described by the DLSE, and is not an expense of discharging the
duties of employment, within the meaning of Labor Code section
2802, but is rather an expense which is to be borne by the
individual officer.”90 But the additional training that the city
required, which was “instituted purely to satisfy the needs of the
city, is employer-mandated training and therefore an expense
which the city must bear.”91
Opinion Letter on Cost of Licensure Training Not Usually Payable by Employer
(Nov. 17, 1994)).
85. See id. (“There is generally no requirement that an employer pay for
training leading to licensure or the cost of licensure for an employee.” (internal
citations omitted)).
86. See id. (explaining the application of Labor Code § 2802).
87. Id. at 1505.
88. Id. at 1507.
89. Id. at 1506–07
90. Id. at 1507 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, Div. of Labor Standards
Enf’t, Opinion Letter on Cost of Licensure Training Not Usually Payable by
Employer (Nov. 17, 1994)). The officers challenging the reimbursement policy
argued that, because the city required all new hires (including those who were
already POST certified) to undergo POST certification training at the city’s police
academy, instead of permitting them to do so through other training programs
approved by the state POST commission, that part of the training should also be
treated as employer-mandated. Id. at 1508. The court did not address that
argument, because “[t]he case was tried on an all-or-nothing basis—either the
acknowledgment was enforceable or it was not” and “no evidence was admitted at
trial which would permit apportionment of the cost of the academy between the
basic POST certification training and the employer-mandated training.” Id.
91. Id. Under this reasoning, if Heder had arisen in California, the
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The decision, while favorable to the employees in that case,
still leaves open the questions of whether the distinction between
legally-mandated and employer-mandated training is reasonable,
and how to draw the line.92 One answer may turn on the portability
of the training. If the employer requires special training for its own
particular needs or interests, it may have little or no value for
employees who leave. Whereas, if the training qualifies employees
for a license or certification legally required for anyone engaged in
an occupation, and which employees might otherwise receive
elsewhere (either at their own or someone else’s expense), there
does seem to be some unfairness in having an employer foot the
bill only to have the employee leave, depriving that employer of the
benefit, and giving the employee (and their subsequent employer)
a free ride. Moreover, under the latter scenario, at least in a
competitive labor market, the new employer might be willing to
pay some premium to recruit a trained and licensed employee—
instead of having to provide the training itself—which could offset
all or part of the employee’s repayment obligation to the former
employer.93

repayment provision would have been invalid. In that case, the city “decided that
all of its firefighters must be certified as paramedics” and then negotiated with
the firefighters’ union over the terms of payment for the requisite training. Heder
v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 2002). Because paramedic
certification was not a general licensing or similar legal requirement for
employment as a firefighter, Labor Code § 2802 would require the city to bear the
cost and prohibit any reimbursement obligation.
92. A good example of a borderline question is the issue that the court
declined to reach in the Acknowledgement Cases: Whether the city could require
reimbursement for the POST certification portion of the training that all new
hires were required to complete at the city’s police academy, even though state
law would allow them to take that training at other facilities (and indeed may
already have done so before joining the LAPD). See In re Acknowledgement Cases,
239 Cal. App. 4th 1498, 1508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
93. This notion is merely a variation on a premise Judge Easterbrook relies
on in Heder. Employers who only hire employees who have already received
training elsewhere, either because of the employer’s preference or because of legal
requirements, “must pay [for the training] indirectly, through a higher
salary . . . .” Heder, 295 F.3d at 781. The implication appears to be that the
additional pay compensates employees, not only for the enhanced value of their
work by virtue of the training, but also for the cost they incurred in self-financed
training. The premise that employers “must” pay a training premium is
empirically questionable, especially in the context of monopsonistic labor
markets. See infra Part 3.
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Outside California, however, the outlook for employees is dim.
One striking example is the recent case of Park v. FDM Group
(Holdings) PLC,94 in which the court dismissed a challenge to a
creative scheme for labor exploitation.95 Under this arrangement,
new FDM recruits serve a training period lasting up to six months,
during which they are unpaid.96 They are then employed as “FDM
Consultants” at an annual salary of $23,000 plus daily bonuses
depending on the number of hours worked.97 The “Employment
Agreement” imposes “a Termination Fee of $30,000 if the
Consultant leaves employment within the first year, and $20,000
in the event the Consultant leaves employment in the second
year.”98 There is, however, no corresponding “minimum two-year
commitment” on the part of FDM, which remains free to discharge
the employee at will whenever it wishes.99
The plaintiff relied primarily on FLSA.100 First, she contended
that she should have been paid during the six weeks she was
labelled a “Trainee.”101 FDM argued that she was not entitled to
compensation for that period, pointing to a recitation in its
“Training Agreement” that trainees are not employees.102
Dismissing that claim, the court held that the Training Agreement
dispelled any “expectation on plaintiff’s part that she would receive
compensation . . . .”103
94. No. 16 CV 1520-LTS, 2017 WL 946298 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017).
95. See id. at *1 (addressing the alleged improper conduct of a business
involved in recruiting and training individuals in information technology related
skills).
96. See id. at *1 (describing the circumstances surrounding initial
recruitment).
97. See id. (describing the consultant position).
98. See id. at *1–2 (describing the repayment obligations triggered at
different exit times).
99. See id. at *3 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall give rise to a
relationship of employee and employer between you and FDM . . . .”).
100. See id. (“Plaintiff asserts claims for minimum wage and overtime
violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . .”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court applied the “primary beneficiary” standard for assessing
the legality of unpaid internships under the FLSA, recently adopted by the
Second Circuit in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 533–34 (2d
Cir. 2016), and subsequently embraced by other federal courts and the Trump
administration’s Department of Labor. See, e.g., Benjamin v. B & H Educ., Inc.,
877 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2017); see also, e.g., Hollins v. Regency Corp., 867
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Second, the plaintiff challenged the $20,000 “Termination
Fee” as an unlawful kickback that effectively reduced her pay

F.3d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 2017); Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d
1199, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015); Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc., No.
14-CV-10887, 2018 WL 4701706, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2018) U.S. Dept. of
Labor, “Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under The Fair Labor Standards
Act”
(last
updated
January
2018)
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Solis v.
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying
multi-factor primary beneficiary analysis “for determining whether an
employment relationship exists in the context of a training or learning situation”
pre-Glatt). But see Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 908 F.3d 643, 647 (10th Cir. 2018)
(declining to adopt Glatt standard to FLSA claim by participant in “mandatory
clinical training program leading to a state-licensed profession”). Under that
standard, a court engages in a “weighing and balancing [of] all the circumstances”
of the internship to determine “whether the intern or employer is “the primary
beneficiary of the relationship.” Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537–38. The Glatt court
identified a “list of non-exhaustive factors to aid courts in answering that
question.” Id.
One problem with the primary beneficiary test is that there is no evident metric
for weighing the respective benefits to employers and interns. FDM illustrates
this problem. The court recites the putative benefits of the training arrangement
to the plaintiff, while ignoring any benefits the company derived from her work
as a trainee. FDM, 2017 WL 946298 at *3. Without offering any explanation of
how it balanced the scales, the court then simply declares that the plaintiff was
“the primary beneficiary.” Id.
A more fundamental objection is that the primary beneficiary test is
inconsistent with the essential premise of the wage and hour provisions of the
FLSA, which is that those who perform economically valuable labor under the
direction and control of employers should receive compensation in the specific
form of wages. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.27 (requiring payment of wages in cash or
equivalent). The primary beneficiary test subverts this policy, by allowing
employers to reap economic value from workers’ labor while evading the
obligation to pay wages because those workers ostensibly derive some other
non-monetary benefits from the experience. The primary beneficiary test opens
the door to rampant exploitation, particularly of entry-level and other vulnerable
workers, through the expediency of designating jobs as “internships” or “training
programs.” In this regard, cases like Glatt and FDM have a significance beyond
the specific legal issues raised. They are moments in a broader, ongoing
degradation of labor standards through a wholesale assault on labor and
employment law, labor unions, and other institutions that protect and empower
workers. See Steven Hill, A Rundown of All the Ways Trump Is Overseeing an All
Out, Under-the-Radar Attack on Workers, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/21391/trump_workers_labor_unions_nlrb
/ (reviewing recent trends in federal labor and employment law and policy) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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below the minimum wage.104 That argument fared no better than
it did in Hassey.105 The Park court found that:
[E]ven assuming that the amount of the Termination Fee, when
subtracted from the compensation Plaintiff earned as a
consultant, would result in a net figure below the aggregate
minimum wage for the consultant period, Plaintiff has not
alleged facts that would support a finding that the fee
constituted an illegal kickback.106

In support of this conclusion, the court relied on the
Employment Agreement, which characterized the Termination
Fee as “liquidated damages approximating the damages FDM
suffered by reason of breach of the Employment Agreement prior
to the completion of the two-year contracted period.”107
Remarkably, the court did not apply, nor even mention, the
established legal standard for assessing the validity of a liquidated
damages clause.108 Instead, the court merely declared that “[t]he
$30,000 maximum fee corresponds to the maximum value of the
training, as set forth in . . . the Training Agreement,” without any
inquiry into how FDM arrived at that figure or whether it plausibly
represented a realistic estimate of the actual cost.109
Instead of trying to force the FLSA peg into the
post-employment obligation hole and allowing FDM to define all
its own terms with its own agreements, the plaintiff should have
attacked the agreement at its foundation. First, the plaintiff could
have argued that the contract—under which she was employed
at-will if she wanted to stay, but employed for a two-year term if
104. Park, 2017 WL 946298, at *2.
105. See City of Oakland v. Hassey, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1477, 1480 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (rejecting Hassey’s argument on this).
106. Park, 2017 WL 946298, at *4.
107. Id.
108. New York law provides that
Liquidated damages . . . are valid if the “damages flowing from a
breach are difficult to ascertain [and under] a provision fixing the
damages in advance . . . the amount is a reasonable measure of the
anticipated probable harm.” On the other hand, if “the amount fixed is
plainly or grossly disproportionate to the probable loss, the provision
calls for a penalty and will not be enforced . . . .”
BBDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 396 (N.Y. 1999) (internal citations
omitted).
109. Park, 2017 WL 946298, at *4.
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she wanted to leave110—was void for failure of mutuality of
obligation.111 Second, the contractual recitation valuing the
training at $30,000—an amount roughly equal to the average
annual tuition at a private college or university112—is by no stretch
of the imagination a plausible estimate of FDM’s damages. As
such, the supposed liquidated damages clause is really an
unenforceable penalty.113 Finally, taken as a whole, the terms of
FDM’s program give the employer free rein to impose any terms or
conditions it wishes and to discharge employees at any time for any
reason without any liability, while leaving employees with only the
Hobson’s choice of forfeiting all or nearly all their earnings as the
price of freedom. Such a grossly one-sided arrangement renders
the agreement unconscionable.114

110. Id. at *1–2.
111. See Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232,, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983) (“[W]here employment is for an indefinite
term it is presumed to be a hiring at will which may be freely terminated by either
party at any time.”); see also Dorman v. Cohen, 66 A.D.2d 411, 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d
377, 380 (1st Dep’t 1979) (stating that an agreement “terminable at will only by
plaintiffs and as to defendants would be binding for the full five-year term” is
“illusory for lack of mutuality of obligation”).
112. See THE COLL. BD., Trends in College Pricing 2017, Table 1,
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-in-collegepricing_0.pdf (showing the average cost of annual tuition) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
113. See BBDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 386, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854,
861, 712 N.E.2d 1220. 1227 (1999) (ruling that liquidated damages provision
imposing amount disproportionate to actual loss constituted unenforceable
penalty); see also Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, 177 A.D.2d 623, 576
N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep’t 1991) (same). In addition to the farcically inflated
valuation of the training, the liquidated damages provision also fails the
requirement that “it would be difficult, if not actually impossible, to calculate the
amount of actual damage” in the event of breach. JMD Holding Corp. v. Cong.
Fin. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 373, 380, 795 N.Y.S.2d 502, 828 N.E.2d 604, 609 (2005)
(quoting Truck Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 424,
393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 361 N.E.2d 1015 (1977)). The actual cost to FDM of training
new recruits would be easy enough to calculate, and FDM most likely keeps track
of those costs as part of its regular business accounting.
114. See Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1988)
(defining unconscionability as “an ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party’”) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965))).
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This set-up extends the exploitation of labor in ways even
Marx did not contemplate.115 For up to six months, employees are
not even paid for their time and work. For the next two years, those
who leave must fork over an amount nearly equal to or even
exceeding their base pay. Those who find the price of a ticket out
too steep will be effectively at the mercy of the employer for the
duration. In form, if not necessarily in extremity, their situation is
not unlike those who are smuggled across the border and then
compelled to work in low-wage, often dangerous or degrading jobs
for years while struggling to pay off their debts to their human
traffickers.

115. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 177–86, in
MARX & ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS, VOL. 35 (Lawrence & Wishart ed., 2010)
(analyzing the capitalist employment relation arising from the sale of a worker’s
labor-power (i.e., their capacity to perform labor) as a commodity). The worker
and employer “meet in the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of
equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both,
therefore, equal in the eyes of the law.” Id. at 178. Despite this formal equality of
the parties, within the capitalist labor relation, capitalists exploit labor by
appropriating the “surplus value” (the difference between the value of what a
worker produces and the value of the wages they receive) created in the labor
process. Id. at 196–209. Yet, Marx assumed that workers under capitalism are
paid some wage and retain the right to limit the duration of the employment
relationship. Otherwise, the worker “would be selling himself, converting himself
from a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity.”
Id. at 178. This essential characteristic of free labor, Marx suggests, finds
expression in laws regulating the duration and termination of employment
contracts. Id. at 178 n. 2.
Even those who might not otherwise embrace Marx’s views agree that the
ability to tell your employer “take this job and shove it” is an essential aspect of
free labor under capitalism:
Under a wage labor system, workers are entirely free to enter or leave
the work relationship as they wish. They cannot be forced or dragooned
into work or compelled to stay at work if they wish to quit. In the eyes
of many conservative theorists, it is this contractual right of refusal—
a right that protects both employer and employee from the coercive use
of his property (capital in the case of the employer, the capacity to labor
in that of the worker)—that constitutes the essential political
foundation of capitalism and, beyond that, its essential justification as
a moral order.
ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM 66 (1985); see
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
138 (quoting the Illinois Federation of Labor President, Victor Olander, as saying,
“[t]he slave is a slave because he is by law prevented from leaving the service of
those for whom he works”).
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Employees who do leave can look forward to more decisions
like Town of Stonington v. Charron.116 After finding that Charron
was hired as a police officer on December 2, 2002, completed his
training on May 2, 2003, and left the department on October 3,
2004, the court authorized the Town of Stonington to
secure the sum of $14,500 (fourteen thousand five hundred
dollars), by (a) attaching sufficient property of Nathan Charron;
(b) attaching or garnishing Nathan Charron’s bank accounts,
certificates of deposit, money market accounts, bonds, treasury
notes, stocks, mutual funds, debts accruing to him; and any and
all annuities or structured pay out contracts to which he is a
beneficiary.117

As for the employee’s argument, the court merely observed that
“defendants question the legal propriety of enforcing the
repayment provisions”118 without deigning to explain why
enforcement was legally proper.
C. Sales Commission Chargebacks and Bonus Recoupments
Another form of post-employment obligation is the
recoupment of commissions or bonuses. An employee is paid what
she often believes to be compensation for work performed, but after
her employment ends, the employer demands a portion be
returned. Employers can bring actions against former employees
for the return of “advances” or “commission chargebacks.”
In Lindell v. Synthes, USA,119 a former sales consultant
challenged deductions from his final paycheck and a counterclaim
for the return of sales commissions.” A company policy manual
provided that, “if a Sales Consultant’s employment is terminated
for any reason, and his/her commissions do not accrue for any of
the reasons specified . . . the Sales Consultant is responsible for
the return of the advance to the Company.”120 The specified
reasons included customers’ failure and tardiness to pay.121
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

40 Conn. L. Rep. 775 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
Id.
Id.
155 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1088.
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The court ruled that “an employer may make an advance on
commissions to employees ‘and later reconcile’ any overpayments
by deductions from future commissions.”122 Under the company’s
compensation plans, “sales consultants earn commissions upon
completion of a sale. Payment is disbursed once an invoice is
received; however, the money is considered an advance until
payment is received from the customer.”123
California courts have held that “the obligation to pay a
commission may be contingent on events that occur after the sale
(such as the customer returning the merchandise), and amounts
advanced to the salesperson may be deducted at a later date if the
contingencies are not satisfied.”124 “However, the preconditions to
earning the commission must be ‘clearly expressed,
generally . . . in writing,’ ‘must relate to the sale,’ and ‘cannot
merely serve as a basis to shift the employer’s cost of doing
business to the employee.’”125
This “sale-related” versus “cost-of-doing-business” dichotomy
is similar to the “legally-required” versus “employer-required”
distinction for training reimbursements under Labor Code § 2802.
After all, the employer under capitalism is still expected to bear
some risk and cannot impose all its costs on its sales employees.
Even sales-related expenses, however, can leave the employee with
substantial post-employment obligations.
Judicial treatment of employer claims for recoupment of bonus
payments similarly turns on the contractual terms and conditions
governing when the bonus is earned. Once again, California law
affords greater protection.
In DHR Int’l Inc. v. Charlson,126 for example, the defendant’s
employment agreement provided that he would receive a one-time
bonus of $250,000 if he collected a certain amount of search fees in
his first six months, and another $250,000 if the same amount
were collected in his second six months. Ten months after paying
122. Id. at 1085 (quoting Steinhabel v. Los Angeles Times Commc’ns, 126
Cal.App.4th 696, 707 (2005)).
123. Lindell, 155 F.Supp.3d at 1084.
124. Davis v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 245 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 1333
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 4th
217, 239–40 (Cal. 2007)).
125. Davis, 245 Cal. App. 4th at 1333.
126. No. C 14-1899 PJH, 2014 WL 4808752 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014).
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these bonuses, the employer discharged the employee and
demanded repayment, based on a contract provision declaring that
the bonuses were “subject to a claw back of $105,000 each should
[the employee] depart [the company] within one year of
payment.”127
The court dismissed the employer’s claim, based on California
Labor Code § 221:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to collect or receive from an
employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer
to said employee.128

This provision “prevents an employer from taking back wages
earned and paid, and a commission chargeback is unlawful where
the commission was fully earned at the time of a sale.”129 The court
found that the defendant employee had indeed fully earned the
bonus payments in dispute:
The bonuses were paid as part of Charlson’s “compensation,”
after the search fees were collected. Had the full amount of the
search fees not been collected, Charlson would have been
compensated under DHR’s regular commission schedule. The
requirement that he remain employed for one year afterwards
was not a condition for earning the bonuses, as the bonuses had
already been earned. Moreover, because his remaining
employed for one year was not something that was entirely
within his control, it cannot be viewed as a condition he was
required to fulfill in order to retain the bonuses.130

Because the employee had “satisfied the condition precedent
for earning the one-time bonuses—the payment of $550,000 in
search fees for each of the six-month periods,”131 Labor Code § 221
precluded the employer from taking back that portion of the
employee’s wages.
In another case, an economic consulting firm paid an employee
$225,000 a year as a “draw” against commissions.132 If his
127. Id. at *1–2.
128. Id. (quoting Cal. Labor Code § 221).
129. Id. at *7.
130. Id. at *6.
131. Id.
132. Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Savage, JAMS, Ref. No. 1425024745,
Decision on Motion for Summary Disposition (2017).

JUST WHEN I THOUGHT I WAS OUT

77

employment ended, his contract provided that he had to pay back
the difference between $195,000 of the draw and his actual
earnings in each year, or in this instance, approximately
$160,000.133
In a preliminary ruling, the arbitrator defined the issue:
Whether the “additional draw” obtained after the first year
constituted wages which could never be subjected to a “claw
back” under the California Code, or whether it was an advance
which, under California case law, can be recovered. This is
particularly so where, as here, there is an express agreement
for recoupment.134

Addressing the agreement’s characterization of the payment
as an “advance,” the arbitrator held:
[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that the “additional draw”
which was paid to respondent after his first year in the employ
of claimant constituted an earned wage that could not be
recovered under California Labor Code sec. 221. To the
contrary, it had sufficient indicia of being an advance, for which
courts have allowed recovery. This is particularly so where, as
here, the employment contract specifically provides for
recoupment upon not achieving principal earnings at a level
equal to the “Combined Draw” that was to be paid to respondent
on a monthly basis.135

The arbitrator thus concluded “whether the ‘additional
earnings’ that respondent received constituted earned wages or
were merely as advance” was one of the “factual issues to be
determined as the hearing.”136 After the hearing, the arbitrator
held without explanation “that the ‘additional earnings’ were
advances that were subject to recoupment pursuant to the
employment agreement between the parties.”137

133. Id.
134. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3–4.
137. Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Savage, JAMS, Ref. No. 1425024745,
Final Award, 2–3 (2018) (Gische, Kapnick, Oing, Moulton, Arbs.). The arbitrator
also determined that the employee had earned more in commissions than he was
paid. Id. Setting off that amount against the employer’s claim, the arbitrator
awarded the employer approximately $106,000. Id.
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Once again, the law outside California is much less protective
of employees in this position.138 In Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Shipp,139
for instance, the employer sued to recover a $100,000 relocation
bonus it had paid the employee when he agreed to move from
Omaha to Chicago at the employer’s request.140 A bonus agreement
signed by the employee provided that he would reimburse the
employer for the full amount of the bonus if he voluntarily
terminated his employment within three years.141 About eighteen
months later, the employee tendered his resignation and
subsequently took a job with one of the employer’s competitors.142
When the employer sued to recoup the bonus money, the
employee defended by contending that he had been constructively
discharged, and as such had not voluntarily terminated his
employment to trigger the repayment obligation.143 Denying the
employer’s motion for summary judgment, the court held that
there was a genuine question of material fact as to “whether
defendant was involuntarily terminated from his employment,”
and directed that the case proceed to trial on that issue.144
It is noteworthy that the employee in Shipp did not otherwise
contest the validity or terms of the bonus agreement.145 Under
California law, he might have argued, along the lines of
138. Compare DHR Int’l Inc. v. Charlson, No. C 14-1899 PJH, 2014 WL
4808752 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) (showing California courts’ pattern to deny
employers remittance of payments owed by former employees), with Conagra
Foods, Inc.v. Shipp, No. 8:01CV647, 2003 WL 431613, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 24,
2003) (indicating an example of the unwillingness of non-California state courts
to rule for the employer in repayment cases).
139. See Conagra Foods, 2003 WL 431613, at *2 (denying the employer’s
motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of fact existed: Namely,
the parties disputed over whether or not the employee was involuntarily
terminated).
140. Id. The relocation bonus was in addition to moving expenses that the
company paid. Id.
141. See id. (describing the provision of the agreement that underlies the fact
under dispute).
142. See id. (detailing the facts of the case surrounding the employee’s
termination).
143. See id. (explaining the employee’s defense to the employer’s complaint to
recover benefits).
144. Id. at *3.
145. See id. at *2 (noting that the employee only defended against the
agreement on the grounds that he was involuntarily terminated, not any
challenges to the underlying provision itself).
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Charlson,146 that he fully earned the bonus once he fulfilled the
condition that he relocate as the company requested. Thus, the
employer Labor Code § 221 precluded the employer from
demanding repayment.147 He might also have argued that his
relocation was “in direct consequence of the discharge of
his . . . duties” to his employer, and that the bonus was, in effect,
indemnification for the “expenditures or losses he necessarily
incurred” in doing so, as required under Labor Code § 2802.148 It is
uncertain whether these arguments would prevail under
California law, but they would almost certainly be of no avail
elsewhere.
III. Repayment Obligations, Monopsony, and Exploitation
Repayment obligations represent a novel instrument of labor
exploitation in two respects.149 First, by deterring employees from
changing jobs, they expose employees to more intense exploitation
within the labor process.150 Second, by permitting employers to
146. See DHR Int’l Inc. v. Charlson, No. C 14-1899 PJH, 2014 WL 4808752
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) (“[O]nce the right to compensation has vested, it has
been earned and cannot be recouped.”).
147. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 221 (West 2018) (rendering it “unlawful for any
employer to collect or receive from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid
by said employer to said employee”).
148. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 2018).
149. See discussion, infra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
150. The “labor process” refers to the production of value through the
performance of work, and the social relations and organizational arrangements
under which production occurs. See A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 297–98
(Tom Bottomore et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) (1983). In the capitalist labor process,
“[w]ork is . . . performed under the supervision, direction and control of the
capitalist” who owns the means of production and hires the workers, “and the
products produced are the property of the capitalist, and not the property of the
immediate producers [i.e. the workers].” Id. Critics, especially within the broad
Marxian tradition, have typically focused on the labor process as the primary site
where labor both experiences and seeks to resist exploitation through
contestation over the scope and intensity of managerial control. See generally
HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOUR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: DEGRADATION OF WORK IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974) (examining managerial strategies aimed at
“deskilling” labor as a means of enhancing control over the labor process, and
workers’ resistance to such efforts); see also generally Stewart Clegg,
Organization and Control, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 545 (1981) (analyzing organizations
with a focus on the formal and informal rules that structure control over the labor
process); Allen Buchanan, Exploitation, Alimentation, and Injustice, 9 CAN. J.
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extract payment from employees who do leave, they extend the site
of exploitation beyond the labor process to the exit door.151
Repayment obligations contribute to exploitation within the
labor process by constraining employee exit, thus blunting, if not
eliminating altogether, the primary mechanism by which
employees can “defend [their] welfare or . . . improve [their]
position.”152 Along with noncompetes and “no-poaching
agreements” (under which “two or more employers agree that they
will not hire each other’s employees”),153 repayment obligations are
a means by which employers gain and maintain monopsony power
in the labor market.154 As a consequence, “workers accept low
wages and substandard working conditions because few
alternative job opportunities exist for them or because switching
jobs is costly. In other words, in the labor market, effectively a
small number of employers are competing for their labor.”155
PHIL. 121 (1979) (arguing that theoretical accounts of exploitation “mistakenly
confine Marx’s concept of exploitation to the labor process itself”).
151. See discussion, infra notes 171–78 and accompanying text.
152. ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 15, 21–29 (1970). For the vast majority of
U.S. employees, who lack union representation and are subject to at-will
termination, neither “voice” nor “loyalty” has much effect. Id.
153. Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income
Workers from Monopsony and Collusion, HAMILTON PROJECT, 5 (Feb. 2018),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_inncome_workers_fro
m_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
154. See id. at 4–5 (“[A]n employer can use non-compete agreements to bind
workers and discourage competitors from entering the market because they will
face a scarcity of available labor.”); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap
Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via
Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 966 (2006) (“[C]urrent
rules of noncompete enforcement fail to provide a complete account of the
bargaining position of workers presented with or subject to noncompete
agreements.”).
155. Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Corporate America Is Suppressing Wages
for Many Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/02/28/opinion/corporate-america-suppressing-wages.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice). Empirical research on noncompetes finds that enforceability is
associated with restricted career patterns and reduced compensation. See
NATARAJAN BALASUBRAMANIAN, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU FOR ECON. STUD,
LOCKED IN? THE ENFORCEABILITY OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE
CAREERS OF HIGH-TECH WORKERS, 6–7, 33 (finding that stricter enforceability of
noncompete agreements is associated with lower wages over the course of an
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Courts enforcing repayment obligations assume (explicitly or
implicitly) that the agreements imposing those obligations are the
products of bargained-for exchange between employees and
employers.156 Such decisions err in failing to recognize the
economic reality of the contemporary labor market, in which
“monopsony is omnipresent.”157 Particularly in this context, the
premise that employees freely and knowingly agree to repayment
provisions becomes tenuous.158 And, as with noncompetes, there is
good reason for concern that employers are imposing these
provisions, not to protect legitimate business interests, but rather
“to solidify their bargaining power vis-à-vis their workers.”159
The combination of “an ‘absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party’” has long been a basis
employee’s tenure with the company); see also Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back:
Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC.
REV. 695, 707 (2011) (“[By asserting property rights over workers’ skills . . . firms
restrict the supply of labor within their industry.”); Sampsa Samila & Olav
Soronson, Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to
Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 427 (2011) (“The firm can usually reap the rewards
of [its] investments because employees cannot benefit elsewhere from their
human capital.”); Mark J. Garmaise, The Ties that Truly Bind: Non-Competition
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L., ECON.,
ORGANIZATION 376, 376 (Aug. 2011) (“[T]ougher noncompetition enforcement
promotes executive stability. Increased enforceability also results in reduced
executive compensation and shifts its form toward greater use of salary.”).
156. See EMPLOYMENT LAW: ESSENTIALS AND BEST PRACTICES § 8.06 (AM. LAW.
INST. 2015) (detailing the enforceability of restrictive covenants in employee
agreements).
157. Kreuger & Posner, supra, note 155 at 23; see COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS,
LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES, at
7–13 (reviewing evidence “that employers often have some degree of monopsony
power in labor markets” and effects on labor market competition, employee
mobility, and wages).
158. Research on noncompetes reveals “that in many cases, workers sign
non-compete clauses without full information on what they are signing or how it
will be enforced,” they are frequently “presented [to employees] . . . only after they
had accepted the job offer,” and that they “are prevalent even in States where
they are not enforced.” COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 157 at 23. This
evidence “suggests workers are not well-informed [about noncompetes],and raises
the possibility of disparate impacts across workers with and without sophisticated
understanding of the legal implications of these agreements.” Id. at 8. There is no
reason to imagine that the impact is any different with respect to repayment
provisions.
159. Id.
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for deeming a contract as unconscionable and unenforceable.160 Yet
courts do not appear to have applied that established standard to
repayment obligations, presumably because employees have not
asserted that defense.161
A case like FDM Group162 illustrates the problem. The
company’s hiring model involves classifying new recruits as
“Trainees” for a period of two to six months, during which they are
unpaid.163 While the opinion does not provide much detail about
what participants actually do during the training period, the
reference to “hands-on-training” suggests that it includes at least
some work for FDM’s paying clients.164 The court justifies this
arrangement on the grounds that the benefit to the training
participants exceeds the benefit to FDM,165 which, under the Glatt
160. Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988)
(quoting Williams v. Walker–Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965)).
161. In a few cases, courts denying enforcement of repayment provisions have
noted the heavy burden they would impose on employees. See Brunner v. Hand
Industries, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting provision would
require employees to pay between half and all of the wages they earned); see also
Heartland Sec. Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, 2000 WL 303274, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,
2000) (“Requiring repayment of up to $200,000, particularly of a recent college
graduate in his first post-college job, approaches indentured servitude.”). These
decisions implicitly recognize the unfairness of the arrangement, even if they do
not explicitly use the doctrine of unconscionability to get there.
162. Park v. FDM Group, No. 16-CV-1520-LTS, 2018 WL 946298, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017) (dismissing plaintiff employee’s claim against FDM
Group for failure to pay minimum wage during training period because plaintiff
was not deemed an “employee”), vacated in other parts, No. 16-CV-1620-LTS,
2018 WL 4100524 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018).
163. Contrary to the facts as presented in FDM Group, a recruitment
brochure available through the company’s website refers to “the paid training
period”. Compare FDM Group, 2018 WL 946298, at *1–3, with FDM: You are the
Next Generation of IT & Business Consultants, at 13 (2017)
https://www.fdmgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/FDM-US-Academy-Brochure.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice). It is possible that FDM changed its practice of not paying
recruits during the training period sometime between 2014, when Park worked
for FDM Group, and 2017 when the brochure was published.
164. Graduates, FDM GROUP, https://www.fdmgroup.com/en-us/us-graduates/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (emphasizing in their “Careers” program that
participants “[w]ork on-site with prestigious clients, gaining hands-on
commercial experience,” but does not specify whether that is true of the training
period or the subsequent two-year period) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
165. See Park, 2017 WL 946298, at *3 (“The training, as described in the
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standard,166 somehow magically makes them something other than
employees. Then, after completing what FDM itself insists is a
highly valuable training, the new hire is offered at job as an IT and
business consultant for $23,000 a year.167 This is about the same
as the average annual pay for food preparation and serving
workers in the New York City area (where the plaintiff in FDM
worked),168 and less than the minimum salary required for an
exempt employee (as FDM classifies the consultants169) under the
FLSA and New York Labor Law.170 It is unlikely that FDM would
be able to pay so little for the services of trained consultants if they
were free to walk out the door and ply their trade elsewhere.
But repayment obligations do not merely enable more intense
exploitation within the labor process. They also extend the locus of
exploitation beyond the workplace floor to the exit door, where the
employer can extract payment by recouping part of the wages the
Complaint, resembles what would be offered at a vocational school, ‘including the
clinical
and
other
hands-on
training
provided
by
educational
institutions’ . . . providing skills that are marketable beyond any particular FDM
client.”). That conclusion is rather easy when the court does not even consider the
economic value to FDM of the work that training participants perform, while
accepting on FDM’s mere say-so that the training is worth $30,000.
166. See id. at *2 (determining whether the trainee is an employee or intern
by considering whether: (1) regular employees are replaced; (2) the trainee has an
expectation of compensation; (3) the training sessions are like ones offered in
vocational school; and (4) whether the employer received an immediate advantage
from the trainee’s work).
167. Id. at *3.
168. See May 2017, Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, New York-Jersey City-White Plains, NY-NJ
Metropolitan
Division,
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STAT.
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_35614.htm#35-0000 (last updated Mar. 30,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
169. Park, 2017 WL 946298, at n.2.
170. The court observes that the plaintiff’s “base rate of pay provides more
than $11 per hour, exceeding the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour and
the New York minimum wage of $8.75 per hour.” Id. at *3. However, the employer
treated the plaintiff as an exempt employee. Id. at n.2. Under the FLSA,
exemption as an executive, administrative, or professional employee requires a
minimum weekly salary of $455 (equivalent to $23,660/year). 29 C.F.R. § 541.600
(2018). Under New York law, the minimum salary for the executive and
administrative exemptions (but not for the professional exemption) is even
higher. In 2014, (when the plaintiff in FDM Group was employed) it was
$600/week (equivalent to $31,200/year). N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12
§142-2.14(4)(i) & (ii) (2017).
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employee has already received for labor already performed, or by
charging the employee for operating costs that the employer would
otherwise have borne out of its own share of product.
Once again, FDM Group provides a good illustration. The
employee in that case had to forfeit $20,000 when she left after
working for a year.171 The court justifies this heavy toll on the
ground that it “approximat[ed] the damages FDM suffered by
reason of breach of the Employment Agreement prior to the
completion of the two-year contracted period.”172
Yet, the premise of at-will employment is precisely that either
party may terminate the relationship at any time, for any reason
or none at all, without being liable for breach of contract.173 An
employer may not simultaneously retain the right to discharge an
employee at will while binding the employee to a two year term.174
Moreover, even assuming an employer should be entitled to recoup
its training investment before a trained employee leaves (rather
than treating that investment as a cost of doing business, as to
which the employer bears the risk of loss),175 FDM has effectively
171. See Park, 2017 WL 946298, at *2 (“Consultant must pay a Termination
Fee of . . . $20,000 in the event the Consultant leaves employment in the second
year.”). Neither FDM’s website nor its recruitment brochure mentions the
repayment obligation; rather, they refer obliquely to “a minimum of two years of
commercial experience,” without explaining that the two-year minimum is a
one-sided commitment. FDM, You Are the Next Generation of IT & Business
Consultants, FDMGROUP.COM, 13 (2017), http://www.fdmgroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/FDM-US-Academy-Brochure.pdf (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); FDM, Your Career Starts Here,
FDMGROUP.COM, https://www.fdmgroup.com/en-us/us-graduates/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
172. Park, 2017 WL 946298 at *4
173. See Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983) (“[O]ur long-settled rule [is] that where
an employment is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at will which
may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even for
no reason.”)
174. See Dorman v. Cohen, 66 A.D.2d 411, 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (1st
Dept. 1979) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs’
breach of contract claim where contract purported to bind defendants for a
definite period while permitting termination at will by plaintiffs).
175. A common justification for training reimbursement obligations is that
they give employers a greater incentive to provide training, by reducing the risk
that employees would abruptly leave, taking the knowledge and skills they have
gained with them. See, e.g., Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 781 (7th
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enjoyed a double recovery. First, the court permits FDM to deny
new recruits the benefits and protections of employee status
during the unpaid training period. Then, the company uses the
Damocles sword of a hefty repayment obligation to insulate itself
from labor market competition, enabling it to pay lower salaries—
indeed, illegally low.176 Finally, without any recognition that the
company has already recouped its investment through the first two
means, the court then permits FDM to demand tribute from the
departing employee in an amount nearly equal to the total salary
it paid her (and that strains credibility as a plausible valuation of
FDM’s training).
Under the prevailing at-will regime, employees who incur
training, relocation or other costs to accept a job assume the risk
that they may lose the job, and with it the value of their
investments, at any time.177 Repayment obligations allow
Cir. 2002) (“[W]hy can’t the employer bear the expense but require
reimbursement if an early departure deprives the employer of the benefit of its
bargain?”). That argument implicitly assumes that employee training is solely a
function of employer investment, rather than a joint product of employer and
employee investments. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind:
Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 376–79, 383–85 (2009) (analyzing effect of noncompetes
on both employee and firm investments in human capital). As such, it fails to take
account of the effect of repayment obligations on employee behavior. Empirical
research on noncompetes finds that they discourage employees from investing in
their own training, as they are less able to convert their investments into higher
compensation by taking (or threatening to take) their knowledge and skills
elsewhere. See id. (“[E]nforceable noncompetition contracts encourage firms to
invest in their managers’ human capital, the contracts discourage managers from
investing in their own human capital, and managers’ investments have a greater
effect than those of the firm.”). The net result thus depends on the relative
significance of employer and employee investments, which may vary across
different situations. See id.
176. But see Heder, 295 F.3d at 781 (asserting that employer’s hiring
already-trained employees “must pay [for the training] indirectly, through a
higher salary”). Where the employer directly pays for the training, the employer
would be expected to pay a correspondingly lower salary. Having done so, the
employer has, in effect, paid itself back for the cost of the training. If the employer
then recoups that same amount from the employee, it receives a windfall.
177. See, e.g., Whiteco Indus. Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (“[I]f the contract is for an indefinite term, our law considers it to
create employment at will.”); see also, e.g., Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus.,
493 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1997) (“North Carolina is an employment-at-will state.”);
Poff v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Under
Minnesota law, absent a contrary agreement by the parties, employment is
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employers to shift additional risk on employees who wish to
exercise their supposedly countervailing right to quit at will (on, in
some cases, if the employer fires them). This includes uncertainty
about the duration of the employment relationship (in the case of
relocation and training expenses), as well as uncertainty about
other events completely outside the employee’s control, such as
customer payments (in the case of commission and bonus
clawbacks). Yet, it is precisely such uncertainty that is commonly
held to justify the employer’s claim on profits to begin with.178
IV. Proposed Solution: Apply a Rule of Reason and Require
Evidence of Actual Expenditures or Advances
Courts or legislatures should adopt standards that guard
against the use of post-employment repayment obligations as
instruments of labor market monopsony and employee
exploitation.
First, a “rule of reasonableness,” analogous to the standard
applicable to noncompetes, should apply to post-employment
presumed to be at-will permitting an employer to dismiss an employee for any
reason or for no reason at all.”); Beyda v. USAir, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1394, 1396
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (“In Pennsylvania employment is presumed to be at-will.”). In a
few cases, courts have recognized an exception to the at-will rule where an
employee gives up secure employment and relocates to accept a new job in
response to the employer’s special recruitment efforts or assurances of security,
only to be fired a short time after commencing work. See, e.g,¸News Printing Co.
v. Roundy, 409 Pa. Super. Ct. 64, 71 (1991) (“When sufficient additional
consideration is present, an employee should not be subject to discharge without
just cause for a reasonable time.”); see also, e.g., Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp. of
Pittsburgh, 406 Pa. Super. Ct. 606, 611–12 (1991) (“[A]n employee can defeat the
‘at-will’ presumption by establishing, inter alia, that the employee gave his
employer additional consideration other than the services for which he was
hired.”); Romack v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind. 1987)
(ruling employment not at-will where employee quit job held for 25 years,
purchased new home, and relocated family in reliance on employer’s assurances
of “permanent employment” during recruitment process).
178. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM 70
(1985) (“[T]he modern explanation of profit as the right of the capitalist to
appropriate any residual, after he has paid out all wages and other costs of
production including depreciation, for which he has hazarded his capital.”); see
also MARK OBRINSKY, PROFIT THEORY AND CAPITALISM 71–92 (1983) (reviewing
Frank Knight’s theory of uncertainty as the basis for profit as entrepreneurial
income).
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Notably,
where
contractual
repayment
obligations.179
post-employment repayment provisions applied only if the
employee went to work for a competitor, courts have treated the
provisions as the functional equivalent of noncompetes and
scrutinized them accordingly under the rule of reasonableness,
holding that the employer’s desire to protect its investments in
training was not a valid business interest to support a noncompete.
Yet,
“competition
neutral”
post-employment
repayment
obligations can inhibit employee mobility and restrain labor
market competition even more than traditional noncompetes. 180
To prevent the use of post-employment repayment obligations
as devices for gaining or bolstering superior bargaining power over
employees, employers should be required to identify a legitimate
business interest, and the terms of the repayment obligations
should be reasonably tailored to protect that interest without
unduly burdening the employee or restraining labor market
competition. This would include limiting the duration that an
employee must remain before being free of the repayment
obligation, as well as limiting the amount of repayment liability in
relation to the employee’s wages or salary.
Factors that might be relevant to assessing the
reasonableness of a repayment obligation could include:
 Whether the employee is hired at-will or enjoys some
security against arbitrary termination by the employer
(as under a collective bargaining agreement or
individual contract);
 Whether the obligation is a non-negotiable, boilerplate
clause in an agreement drafted by the employer or is the

179. See Heartland Securities Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, No. 99-CV-3694-WHP,
2000 WL303274, at *6–9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000) (discussing characteristics of
the “rule of reasonableness.”); see also Brunner v. Hand Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d
157, 159–60 (Ind. App. 1992).
180. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the
Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721,
723 (2002) (explaining that the noncompete doctrine seeks to balance the
employee interest in job mobility and the societal interest in free and competitive
labor markets against the employer interest in protecting business assets and the
judicial interest in enforcing contracts); id. at 739 (“[C]ourts should carefully
scrutinize any efforts by employers to place restrictions on the portability of the
employee’s human capital.”) (emphasis added).
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product of real, knowing, and voluntary bargaining
between the parties.181
 Whether the terms are presented to the employee before
or after accepting employment.
In the case of training costs, reimbursement obligations
should be permitted only for training that imparts general human
capital (which would remain valuable to an employee who goes to
work elsewhere and to the new employer), but not firm-specific
human capital (which would have little or no value to employees
after they leave).182
Some special requirements would also be appropriate to
protect against exploitation:
 Limit the amount of repayment to a reasonable
percentage of the employee’s wages or salary, and
prohibit repayment obligations altogether for low-wage
workers, who are the most vulnerable to exploitation,
particularly in monopsonistic labor markets. 183
Require that repayment obligations be in writing, in clear
terms, and (where included as part of a contract that includes other
provisions) conspicuously placed and specifically signed by the
employee.
Second, employers should generally not be permitted to rely
on liquidated damages clauses, but should be required to support
reimbursement claims with evidence of actual expenditures, costs,
or other damages resulting from the employee’s early departure.
In most cases, the amount at issue will not be uncertain or difficult
to calculate. And, because employees will typically be in no position
181. In Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 2002), and
Milwaukee Area Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm. v. Howell, 67 F.3d 1333,
1335–36 (7th Cir. 1995), for instance, the repayment obligations were the product
of collective bargaining between the employers and labor unions representing the
employees. In such circumstances, there is less concern about inequalities of
bargaining power, and the union can extract corresponding benefits (in the form
of higher wages or otherwise) in exchange for the repayment obligation.
182. See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical
Analysis, 70(5) J. POLIT. ECON. 9 (Oct. 1962) (distinguishing general and
firm-specific human capital); see also David Donaldson and B. Curtis Eaton,
Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Shared Investment or Optimal Entrapment?, 9
CANADIAN J. ECON. 462 (1976) (challenging Becker’s argument that employers
share investments in firm-specific human capital with employees).
183. Cf. Krueger & Posner, supra note 20 (proposing blanket prohibition
against noncompetes for low-wage workers on these grounds).
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to assess the cost or value of training, there is too great a risk of
puffing, if not outright deceit in employer’s representations. At a
minimum, if liquidated damages are ever allowed, courts must
take care to apply the established legal standard, and not merely
take boilerplate recitations and the employer’s unsupported
assertions at face value.
V. Conclusion
Post-employment repayment obligations expose employees to
significant financial risk if they exercise their fundamental right
to quit a job at-will. By deterring employees from leaving, such
provisions give employers even more power over employees,
leaving workers even more vulnerable to exploitation while they
remain in the job. By permitting employers to demand payment as
the price of leaving, they extend the site of exploitation to the exit
door.
Common-law courts have for over a century scrutinized
noncompete agreements and denied enforcement where the terms
are unreasonable. A similar framework should apply to other
post-employment obligations, ensuring that the terms are
reasonably drawn to protect a valid employer interest, without
imposing unjust burdens on employees or erecting excessive
barriers to labor market mobility. Furthermore, employers should
not be permitted to impose post-employment repayment
obligations under the guise of liquidated damages, but should be
required to establish the basis for any amounts they seek to recoup
for relocation expenses, training costs, or advanced payment of
employee compensation. If courts decline to apply these
established common law principles to post-employment repayment
obligations, legislatures should adopt remedial measures.
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VI. Appendix184
A. Letter from Company to Employee

Thanks for taking the time earlier today to discuss your
resignation and obligations to {COMPANY}. During our
conversation, you indicated you will not accept a different
placement with another {COMPANY} client but will resign prior to
completing your two year commitment. As I mentioned, attached
is a copy of your employment agreement. The definitions on page
one contain the amount of the Termination Fee and sections 4.2
and 4.3 address your obligation for payment of the fee under your
circumstances of resignation. Since you are now in your second
year of employment with {COMPANY}, the Termination Fee is
$20,000 rather than $30,000. You will need to pay this fee in full
by your last day on December 3rd.
As I mentioned, the early termination fee is a liquidated
damages amount that compensates {COMPANY} for the damages
it sustains for your failure to comply with your two-year
commitment, particularly since {COMPANY} has to make
representations to its clients for the availability of {COMPANY}’s
consultants for a two-year period. That is how {COMPANY} is able
to retain the business with competitive rates to clients. The
damages fee represents lost costs of investment for training, lost
revenue/profits for the remainder of your two-year commitment
period, potential reputational damage to the client, lost business,
etc. The amounts provided in the agreement are good faith
estimates of such damages at the time you entered into the
contract.
B. Letter from Employee’s Attorney to Company General Counsel
This firm has been retained by {EMPLOYEE}, who until
recently was employed by {COMPANY}. He advises me that you
have been persistently calling and e-mailing {EMPLOYEE},
184. This Appendix presents correspondence regarding an employer’s claim
against a former employee for reimbursement of training expenses. Stuart
Lichten (one of the authors here) represented the former employee in this matter.
The names of the company, the former employee, and a company manager have
been redacted.
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seeking a monetary payment in the form of what you describe as a
“termination fee.” Since {COMPANY} has no reasonable basis for
demanding such a fee, I request that you cease your collection
efforts.
Your claim that {EMPLOYEE} somehow “violated” his
Employment Agreement is unfounded. {EMPLOYEE} was
employed “at will.” Section 1 of the Agreement describes the term
as until “terminated by the Parties.” Section 4.1 of the Agreement
states, “The Company may terminate this Agreement without
cause at any time and at its sole discretion by giving written notice
to that effect.” Any contention that {EMPLOYEE} breached the
Agreement by resigning before the end of two years, but that
{COMPANY} was not required to employ him for any period of
time, would obviously fail for lack of mutual obligation, lack of
consideration, and under the circumstances, unconscionability. See
Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 235, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983) (“where employment
is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at will which
may be freely terminated by either party at any time”); Dorman v.
Cohen, 66 A.D.2d 411, 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (1st Dep’t 1979)
(agreement “terminable at will only by plaintiffs and as to
defendants would be binding for the full five-year term” is “illusory
for lack of mutuality of obligation”). As {EMPLOYEE} was not in
breach, there can be no damages.
Even if {EMPLOYEE} were somehow in breach of the
Agreement, the liquidated damages provision is unenforceable. In
New York, such provisions are only “valid if ‘the damages flowing
from a breach are difficult to ascertain,’” and the “‘amount is a
reasonable measure of the anticipated probable harm.’” BBDO
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 396, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 861,
712 N.E.2d 1220, 1227 (1999) (citing City of Rye v. Public Serv.
Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393, 315
N.E.2d 458, 459 (1974)). If “the amount fixed is plainly or grossly
disproportionate to the probable loss, the provision calls for a
penalty and will not be enforced.” Truck Rent-A-Center v. Puritan
Farms 2nd, 41 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369, 361 N.E.2d
1015, 1011 (1977).
{COMPANY} can satisfy none of these requirements. There is
no reason why the costs of “training” {EMPLOYEE} would be
difficult to ascertain, other than that they are infinitesimal. A
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“termination fee” of $20,000 cannot possibly be a reasonable
measure of harm where {EMPLOYEE} was only paid $23,000 in
basic salary the first year, and an annual rate of $25,000 in basic
salary the second year. {COMPANY} seeks to penalize
{EMPLOYEE} almost his entire first year’s basic pay. See
Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, 177 A.D.2d 623, 576
N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep’t 1991) (one year’s gross medical fees would
be so disproportionate to the loss as to constitute unenforceable
penalty); Ford v. Cardiovascular Specialists, P.C., 103 A.D. 3d
1222, 959 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep’t 2013) (150 percent of annual
income unenforceable penalty). Any “training” cost to {COMPANY}
is surely outweighed by the amount earned in profit by
{COMPANY} from the exploitation of {EMPLOYEE}’s labor.
The Employment Agreement {EMPLOYEE} was compelled to
sign is unconscionable and plainly unenforceable. An entry-level
employee should not have to bankrupt himself to escape his
corporate employer. I suggest you deploy your resources elsewhere.
C. Response from Company General Counsel
Thank you for the letter on behalf of your client {EMPLOYEE}.
It probably makes the most sense to set up a call to discuss, but in
the meantime, I’d like to point out a few issues and give some
background before we talk to make sure we’re on the same page
since it appears you are not familiar with {COMPANY}’s business.
First, you need to understand that the two-year commitment
is the key to {COMPANY}’s successful business model.
{COMPANY} provides training in its in house training academy
followed by work experience through placements with
{COMPANY}’s client base for graduates who would not on their
own normally be able to get this training and work experience with
the type of clients {COMPANY} has. This is the very reason
graduates choose {COMPANY}. In exchange for the training at no
cost to the employee, {COMPANY} requires a two-year
commitment from the employee in order to recover its investment
plus a return and also to offer competitive rates to clients.
Importantly, based on the employees’ contractual commitments,
{COMPANY} makes representations to its clients that the
consultants are available for a two-year period. The quality of
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consultants, the two-year availability that allows for continuity of
services and the competitive rates are what makes {COMPANY}’s
model so desirable with clients, which in turn provides for more
work experience opportunities for graduates working through
{COMPANY}. All of this is driven by the two-year commitment.
When the employee/consultant does not honor that two-year
commitment, then {COMPANY} is often in breach of its contractual
arrangement with its clients and can lose significant business or
spend time and money to replace a consultant on the client site
often with a “no charge” period. Accordingly, the early termination
fee is to compensate {COMPANY} for damages due to the
employee’s failure to complete the two-year commitment. Yes,
{EMPLOYEE} could leave whenever he wanted (he is not in
indentured servitude), but he needed to comply with his
contractual obligation to pay the early termination fee. He has
wholly failed to do so. {COMPANY} is very transparent to all
candidates interested in {COMPANY} as to the obligations.
{EMPLOYEE} knew his obligations before he started with
{COMPANY} and he knew them when he chose to resign early.
Second, the liquidated damages provision is fully enforceable.
At the time of entering the contact, the damages {COMPANY}
potentially could have suffered for {EMPLOYEE}’s failure to
complete his two year commitment were in excess of the liquidated
damages amount of $20,000 (and in fact are in excess of $20,000),
so the contractual damages amount is certainly a reasonable
measure of the anticipated probable harm. The liquidated
damages do not just simply represent the costs of training (which
are certainly not infinitesimal as you state). While the liquidated
damages fee does in part represent lost costs of investment for
training, it also represents lost revenue/profits for the remainder
of his two year commitment period, potential reputational damage
to the client, lost business, costs of replacement, etc. The liquidated
damage amount provided in the contract is a good faith estimate
of such damages at the time he entered into the contract. It is
certainly reasonable and enforceable. Additionally, I don’t follow
your circular logic of arguing that {EMPLOYEE}’s base salary
somehow determines what {COMPANY}’s damages are.
{COMPANY}’s damages are separate and independent from
{EMPLOYEE}’s base salary. While a comparison can be used by a
court to determine reasonableness, the salary does not determine
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the damages. In other words, if for example {COMPANY} charged
“one year’s salary” as liquidated damages for potential losses of
$5,000 then that would not be reasonable. I note that in the Ford
case you site, 150% of annual income and bonus would have been
approximately $555,000 which was grossly disproportionate to
evidence of potential damages for the alleged breach. A similar
result was reached in Novendstern. In both cases the court appears
to have then allowed proof of actual damages. Your reliance on
these cases is not persuasive and is certainly not the situation with
the matter at hand where damages are in excess of {EMPLOYEE}’s
salary, but even if you are correct, then {COMPANY}’s proof of
actual damages would be in excess of the liquidated damages
amount.
Additionally, while you point out {EMPLOYEE}’s base salary,
you fail to point out that he also was paid a daily performance
bonus of $88 for each day working on a client site. This daily bonus
increased his second year. Before he started training, the salary
and daily bonus were all clearly explained as was the two year
commitment and early termination fee. If {EMPLOYEE} didn’t like
any of that, he was not obligated to work for {COMPANY}. But once
he made that contractual commitment, {COMPANY} represented
his availability for two years to its clients.
Third, regardless of the contractual and legal obligations in
this regard, {COMPANY} also just feels cheated and dishonored.
{COMPANY} met its obligation to {EMPLOYEE} by providing
training and work experience, but {EMPLOYEE} is now refusing
to pay his contractual early termination fee and has injured
{COMPANY}’s relationship with its client. It is frustrating from
{COMPANY}’s standpoint when {EMPLOYEE} knew his
obligations at the very beginning, signed his contract and has
never complained of the termination fee or the two year
commitment. He knew {COMPANY}’s model and his obligation,
but is now simply trying to avoid the consequences of actions.
Lastly, even if he was not happy at {COMPANY}, there is no
excuse for being unprofessional and avoiding a discussion about
his contractual obligation. In an effort to help the situation,
{COMPANY} offered to find him another placement with a
different client, but he refused without explanation and simply just
left. For some reason he sent the following rather abrupt email
after what I perceived to be a cordial phone conversation with me:
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I intend to work until December 3, 2015, assuming that the
company can maintain a professional work environment. I have
nothing further to say regarding any other issue.
Regards,
{EMPLOYEE}
Despite this representation to {COMPANY} (which
{COMPANY} then in turn represented to its client) that
{EMPLOYEE} would work a notice period through the 3rd of
December, he failed to show up at work. {EMPLOYEE} had also
indicated on a phone call with me that he would send me his
reasons for his resignation, but he never did. This conduct has
made it very difficult for {COMPANY} to explain to its client why
{EMPLOYEE} left his placement and has damaged {COMPANY}’s
relationship with this client. So {COMPANY} finds it ironic that
{EMPLOYEE} demanded a professional work environment while
he himself has not done so. Part of {COMPANY}’s training teaches
consultants professional skills and how to properly conduct
themselves in a professional environment on a client site. Being
honest, communicative and honoring contractual commitments are
all skills in that regard. Allowing {EMPLOYEE} to avoid his
contractual obligation in this matter will not serve him well in his
career. {COMPANY} expects him to honor his commitment.

Therefore, despite your comment that “{COMPANY}has
no reasonable basis for demanding such a fee,” the above
clearly shows otherwise.

I hope this helps some with the background and will aid our
discussion to resolve this matter. As you can tell by this lengthy
email, this is an important matter to {COMPANY} in which we will
deploy appropriate resources.
D. Response from Employee’s Attorney
The company’s insistence on an entry level employee paying a
“termination fee” to merely move on with his life is not only legally
unenforceable, it is morally repugnant. I will try to stick to the
legal arguments in my response.
First of all, this is an “at will” employment contract, a critical
distinction with your example, which seems to suggest a promise
by the employer to employ the employee for two years. The Term
is defined as “the minimum period of the longer of [whatever that
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means] (i) two years . . . and (ii) completion of the project . . . or
until otherwise terminated by the Parties”, which means there is
no term at all.
Driving home the point, the agreement states, “The Company
may terminate this Agreement without cause at any time and in
its sole discretion.”
Either this is an employment contract with a two year term or
it is an at will employment agreement. It cannot be both. If this
were an employment contract with a two year term, this would be
a different situation, at least as to liability.
Even if this could be construed as a two year contract, with
mutual commitments to a two year employment period, a breach
by an employee does not result in the kinds of damages sought by
{COMPANY}. An employee’s failure to meet contractual
obligations is generally not redressable in an action for damages.
The employer cannot receive tort like damages, and is generally
not entitled to lost profits. Any obligation on the part of an
employee to pay a certain type of damages in the event of a breach
must clearly and specifically state those obligations in the
agreement. This agreement does not specify a type of damages, but
merely states that the termination fee is intended to “compensate
the company for the damages it will sustain due to the Employee’s
breach.”
Furthermore, the liquidated damages provision is
unenforceable for the reasons laid out in my initial response.
You refer to the unpaid mandatory training {EMPLOYEE}
was required to attend. Not only could he “receive the training and
walk whenever he wanted without paying anything,” the training
requirement itself violates the Fair Labor Standards Act and state
law, an issue, in addition to {COMPANY}’s failure to pay overtime,
we will certainly raise, perhaps on a class basis, if this matter is
litigated. The training in this case was not a master’s degree from
Harvard, which might be noncompensable. It was mandatory, held
during normal work hours, and directly related to {EMPLOYEE}’s
job.
Finally, you describe {EMPLOYEE}’s conduct as a “complete
lack of professionalism.” On November 12, 2015, {EMPLOYEE}
received a letter from someone named {NAME}, who informed him
that unless {EMPLOYEE} paid the company $20,000 by December
3, 2015, {COMPANY} would “deduct your final wages [sic] in order
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to partially settle your liability.” Such a deduction would plainly
violate state law. In other words, the company was about to steal
{EMPLOYEE}’s wages for his last 15 days of work. {COMPANY}’s
conduct was beyond unprofessional; it was thuggish.
{EMPLOYEE} was forced to react accordingly.
In the end, your interesting use of language (“provide
training,” “give you job experience”) betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the dynamics of the workplace. Employees
have very few rights under this legal and economic system, but
some of the few they have include an entitlement to be paid for
their labor, and the freedom to quit whenever they want.
{COMPANY}’s business model, which apparently presumes that
the employer is doing the employee a favor by allowing him to work
for the company, and that therefore the employee owes the
company more than just an honest day’s work for an honest day’s
pay, represents a degradation of the worker to which even the
current legal environment has not yet descended. {EMPLOYEE} is
not interested in furthering that business model, and in fact, we
would be happy to help hasten its demise by filing an answer and
counterclaim to any action.

